SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS-DE-FENSE OF LACK OF MUTUALITY.
First Paper.
MUTUALITY AS UNDERSTOOD IN THE EIGHTEENTH

CENTURY.

Mutuality is a legal term used in several different senses.
When a court declares that a contract lacks mutuality, without further examination, we cannot be sure of the idea
intended to be conveyed. A contract is an agreement for
the breach of which there is a legal sanction. If for any
reason there is perhaps an agreement or an apparent agreement but no contract, we frequently find the court declaring
that the "contract lacks mutuality." In cases of this character the expression "lack of mutuality" really means that
there is no contract. The defence of "no contract," whether
explained on the ground of lack of mutuality or not, is as
fatal to a bill for specific performance as it is to an action for
damages for a breach of the alleged but not existing contract.
The expression "lack of mutuality," however, is also used
to cover a special defence to a bill for specific performance,
which defence would not be available to the defendant if the
plaintiff sued him on the contract at law. An illustration
will perhaps convey clearest this use of the expression. B.
promises to convey land to A. and A. promises to pay B.
in personal services. B. refuses to convey the land as
promised. A. brings a bill in equity for specific performance. The defendant B. admits the existence of a binding contract, and also admits the breach on his part, but
says that there is a "lack of mutuality," and therefore the
plaintiff's bill should be dismissed. By this the defendant
means that there is a lack of mutuality in the remedy; that
is, that if the defendant sought to enforce the plaintiff's
unexecuted promise, the court could not order the present
plaintiff, who would then be defendant, to fulfill his unexecuted promise to perform personal services. We have, therefore, at least two uses of the expression "lack of mutuality;"
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one denoting a defect in the agreement which prevents it
from being a contract either in law or equity, the other
denoting merely a lack of mutuality in the remedy in equity.
Lack of mutuality of remedy is a good defence in equity
in a certain class of cases. The first successful use of this
defence in England was in 1828, in the case of Flight v.
Bolland.1 In this case A., an infant, entered into a contract with B. B. refused to perform. A. brought his
bill against B. for specific performance of the contract. The
plaintiff being an infant was not amenable to an order of a
court of chancery. Had therefore the defendant been the
plaintiff he could not have had specific performance of A.'s
promises. The court dismissed the plaintiff's bill, saying,
"It is not doubtful that it is a general principle of courts of
equity to interpose only where the remedy is mutual." The
case is not contra to Clayton v. Ashdown, M. S. S. Rep.
Trin. 13 Ann in Chanc. 9 Vin. Ab. 393, a case cited by
counsel for the plaintiff as a case where specific performance
was granted on a contract made by an infant. In the earlier
case the court held, that the fact of the assignor being an
infant at the time of making the contract, did not prevent
the plaintiff having specific performance. The assignor was
not an infant at the time of its assignment.
The application of the rule requiring mutuality in the
remedy so as to prevent an infant from having specific performance has recently been questioned in Colorado.2 As late
as 1895, however, Flight v. Bolland was expressly followed
in England. 3 The view of the Colorado court was that this
application of the rule would be "permitting the adult party
to directly reap the advantage and benefit from the infancy
of the contracting party."
In England and the United States the doctrine that the
remedy must be mutual has been applied to cases where the
plaintiff's unexecuted promises are promises which the
courts refuse to make a defendant in a suit for the specific
Russell 298. See for earlier application of idea in action of
defendant, "That the course of justice shall run equally." Blackstone's
Com., B. III, p. 345.
'Seaton v. Tohill, 53 Pac. i7o, Col., 1898.
'Lumley v. Ravenscroft, i Q. B. 683, 1895.
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performance of a contract perform, either because of the mechanical difficulty of executing a decree or because such a decree would interfere to too great an extent with personal liberty. Thus courts of equity refuse to decree the performance of personal services. And where the promises of the
defendant involve a long series of acts, as the building or
management of a railroad, the court of equity will refuse
to interfere because of the mechanical difficulty of executing
a decree should one be made. So where the unexecuted
promises of the plaintiff are to perform personal services
for the defendant the court refuses to interfere at the
instance of the plaintiff on the gound of lack of mutuality in
the remedy.4
The same principle has been applied to cases in which the
plaintiff has an unexecuted promise to build5 or manage a
7
railway6 or conduct a grain elevator.
I have stated that Flight v. Bolland is the first case in
England which recognizes the principle that there must be
'Pickering v. The Bishop of Ely, 2 Y. & Coll. C. C. 249, 1843; Stocker
v. Wedderburn, 3 Kay & Johnson, 293, 1857; Ogden v. Fossick, 4 De G.,
F. & J., 426, 1862; Brett v. East India London Shipping Co., 2 H. & M.
4o4, 1864; Bourget v. Monroe, 25 N. W. 514, 1885 (agreement to support
the defendant); See also Simon v. Wildt, 84 Ky. 157, i886; Iron Age
Pub. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 83 Ala. 498, 1887; Pingle v. Connor, 66 Mich. 187, 1887; Ballou v. March, 133 Pa. 64, i89o; Grunmer
v. Carlton, 93 Cal. i89, 1892; Chadwick v. Chadwick, 25 So. 631, Ala.,
x899. The last case deals with the question whether the court could
force the plaintiff to support the defendant. The question is answered
in the negative and therefore specific performance denied tothe plaintiff.
See contra on the point that a court of equity cannot specifically enforce
a promise to support another. Hackhett v. Hackhett, 4o Atl. 434, N. H.,
1893. See also Stamper v. Stamper, 28 S. E. 2o, N. C., 1897.
SWaring v. The Manchester, Sheffield, Lincolnshire Ry. Co., 7 Hare,
482, 1849; Johnson v. Shrewsbury & Birmington Ry. Co., ig E. L. &
Eq. R. 584, 1853; Peto v. B. & W. and Tw. Ry. Co., i Hemming & Miller,
468, 1863. Ross v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., i Woolworth, 26, 1863. So
also where the building of a ship was involved. Merchants' Trading
Co. v. Bauner, L. R., 12 Eq. Cases, 18, I87i.
'Blackett v. Bates, L. R., i Ch. Ap. 11, i865; Lattin v. Hazard, 91
Cal. 87, i89I; Rev. 2 H. & M. 270; Pullman Car Co. v. Texas Pac. Ry.
Co. 4, Wood C. C. 317, 1882.
' Richmond v. Dubuque & Sioux City R. R., 33 Ia. 422, 1871. On the
general principle Mayger v. Cruse, 5 Mont. 485, 1885.
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mutuality in the remedy in a suit for the specific performance of a contract in equity. In view of the statement of the
Master of the Rolls in that case, that "it is not disputed that
it is a general principle of the courts of equity to interpose
only where the remedy is mutual," my assertion requires an
explanation and a defence. A perusal of the arguments of
counsel in the case of Flight v. Bolland shows that to the
general principle as there stated by the court there were at
that time a number of exceptions. But even the counsel for
the plaintiff does not deny the existence of such a principle,
and there is no evidence that the decision created adverse
comment or, indeed, comment of any kind. Furthermore
modern judges and text-book writers often refer to cases
decided long before 1828 as supporting the assertion that
there must be mutuality in the remedy. It is my purpose
here to examine all cases prior to 1828 which have since
been used by courts or counsel to uphold the principle that
the remedy must be mutual. And first I wish to examine
two cases which come nearer to involving the defence of lack
of mutuality in the remedy than do any of the others.
The first case is Hamilton v. Grant.8 To understand this

case we must refer for a moment to the earlier case of Collins
v. Plummer.9 In Collins v. Plummer, it was intimated that
a covenant in a marriage settlement on the part of the father
not to suffer a recovery was not enforceable against a
devisee of the land who received the land from the father
after he had suffered a recovery. The decision is based on
the quaint reason that when one relies on a covenant,
"equity ought not to vary or alter the security."' 1 In
Hamilton v. Grant the covenant on the part of the plaintiff's
ancestor in title was "not to suffer a recovery." It was)
argued by counsel on the strength of Collins v. Plummer"
3 Dow. 33, 1815.
P. Ins. 104, 1707.
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This case refers to Warrington v. Langham, Pre. In. Ch. 89, where

A., having covenanted to devise his daughter ten thousand pounds, the
court of equity refused to make the covenantor give security for the
performance of his covenant. Collins v. Plummer seems to be a curious
misapplication of the principle correctly applied in the earlier case.
' Page 40.
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that the agreement was not mutual, Lord Redesdale, as one
of the judges, expressing his opinion on the case in the
House of Lords, states this argument as follows: "As the
consideration on the part of Dickson (the plaintiff's
ancestor in title) was of a description not capable of
specific performance, and the agreement not being in that
respect mutual

.

.

.

the plaintiff ought not to have a

specific performance." As a statement of his own opinion
he added: "The agreement was then not mutual; on the one
side specific performance could not be enforced; and when
that is the case equity leaves the parties to law, generally
speaking, unless there were circumstances that did not
occur in this case."'12 The lack of mutuality in the remedy
here spoken of is between the ancestors of the plaintiffs and
defendants. It arises from the idea that a covenant cannot
be specifically enforced. Lord Redesdale himself has many
other objections to granting the relief sought by the plaintiffs, and Lord Eldon, whose opinion in the Lords is also
reported, does not mention the defence of lack of mutuality,
but places his decision mainly on the point of laches.' 3 The
decision is therefore not on the point of mutuality. It is,
however, an authority for the opinion of a learned judge,
which opinion was expressed in voting on the case in the
House of Lords, that mutuality of remedy was then, in I815,
necessary in a suit for the specific performance of a contract.
The second case is that of Bozon v. Farlow.14 There the
defendant having contracted to buy from the plaintiff his
business as an attorney, the plaintiff sought specific performance. The bill was dismissed because the promises of the
vendor were so vague that the court would be unable to
place the defendant in possession of the subject-matter of
the contract. The indefiniteness of the agreement is sufficient to defeat specific performance. It is not a decision
that had the promises of the plaintiff been definite, but not
enforceable, the court would refuse to make the defendant
perform his promises.
In this connection we may examine a case, Smith v. FroPage 42.
Page 55.
Merv. 459, 1816.
Co., 33 Ia. 422, 1871.
14
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inont,15 which, while it has never been cited as far as I am

aware, for the principle that in specific performance the
remedy must be mutual, may be said almost to involve that
principle, since it was decided on one of the grounds on
which the rule is now supported. B. had a contract with
A. by which A. was to furnish horses between two places
for A's coaches. The distance between the two places was
part of the ride from Bristol to London. A. did not furnish the horses, as they had been seized by the sheriff. B.
procured other horses, and A. sought by injunction to
restrain B. from using any but A.'s horses. Lord Eldon
refused to interfere, saying that the plaintiff has not the
means of fulfilling his contract and the court has no means
of compelling him to do so, and therefore to restrain the
defendant from using his own horses might render the
defendant liable to an action by every one whom he had
undertaken to carry from London to Bristol. The court
says nothing of lack of mutuality in the remedy, and on the
facts it is manifestly a different thing to refuse specific
performance, because the plaintiff has given evidence that
he will not live up to his unenforceable and unexecuted
promises, and to refuse specific performance to a diligent
plaintiff merely because he could not be made to perform
his unexecuted promises should he suddenly develop a disposition to break his contract. Nevertheless the case does
contain the idea that a court of equity should not place
a defendant in a position from which it cannot afterwards
extricate him should it become proper to do so, and this
idea as stated is one on which the defence of lack of mutuality in the remedy is now upheld.
The other cases in England before 1828, which are cited
ii support of the principle that the remedy must be mutual,
are cases in which "lack of mutuality" is made the basis for
the decision. The only question in these cases therefore is
whether the term lack of mutuality is used in these cases in
the sense of lack of mutuality in the remedy.
One case often quoted, especially in this country, to
show the necessity of mutuality in the remedy, is merely
s2 Swanston,

330,

I818.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS.

an example of the use of the defence as applicable to
a case where'there is no contract to enforce. This is Armiger v. Clarke.6 In that case the plaintiff's father holding a life estate, agreed to sell as if he were owner of the fee.
The son who did hold the fee, on the death of his father,
brought a bill for specific performance against the purchaser. There was no contract between the plaintiff and the
defendant. The father's covenant did not bind the fee
owned by the plaintiff, therefore the court says: "Since the
lien is not reciprocal it ought not to conclude in a court of
equity." There are, however, other cases in the eighteenth
and early part of the nineteenth century where the defence of
"lack of mutuality" was used, not as indicating that there
was no contract, but as a special defence applicable when a
bill was brought in equity for the specific performance of the
contract. It is therefore necessary, in order to prove that
Flight v. Bolland was the earliest English case involving a
lack of mutuality in the remedy, to show that the special
defence in equity of lack of mutuality as employed in these
earlier cases was not the defence of lack of mutuality in the
remedy, but a different kind of "lack of mutuality" from any
that we have as yet discussed.
Bromley v. Jefferies 7 is the earliest reported case in equity
involving the express statement by the court that there is a
lack of mutuality sufficient to defeat a bill for specific
performance. In that case one Sir Roland Berkley, on
the marriage of his daughter, covenanted with his son-inlaw, Bromley, that if Bromley survived him and there was
issue of the marriage, Bromley should have certain lands
for fifteen hundred pounds less than any other person would
give for them. Sir Roland died, Bromley survived, and
there was issue of the marriage. The court refused Bromley's bill for specific performance of the agreement for two
reasons: first, because of its uncertainty, it not "being practical to know what a purchaser would give for it"; second,
that "the agreement was not mutual; the plaintiff was not
bound to take it at any price." The words "the plaintiff was
18Bunb. III, 1722.

"72 Vernon, 415, 1700.
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not bound to take it at any price" are instructive. They show
that the defence to the plaintiff's bill in the mind of the
court was in the lack of mutuality of the covenants in the
marriage settlement, not in the lack of mutuality of the remedy. But this lack of mutuality in the covenants was not sufficient to render the covenant of the defendant void at law.
Was there then a requirement in equity at this time that there
must be in a contract before it would be enforced, a mutuality
of obligation greater than that required at law to make a
binding contract? If this is so, and if lack of mutuality as
a special defence in a court of equity in the eighteenth and
early part of the nineteenth century meant this special lack
of mutuality in the obligation and not lack of mutuality in
the remedy, then we may expect to find certain applications
of the defence of lack of mutuality in this special sense. In
the first place equity is going to refuse to enforce contracts
in which one party has an option to purchase or other option.
This result realized, Bromley v. Jefferies is again reached
in Bell v. Howard."" There the covenant of the vendor
was that upon the request of the purchaser he would
convey an advowson to him, but the purchaser was only
bound to buy if his solicitor passed the title. The court
pointed out that the articles were not mutual, being obligatory on one party only, and that the vcndor could not have
had execution, because, admitting that the solicitor's
approval was a formal one only, as the title was bad, the
plaintiff under no circumstances was obliged to take.1 9
Outside of cases involving the specific performance of
covenants by a lessor to renew at the option of the lessee,
of which more presently, the two cases just mentioned contain, I believe, the only reported discussions in the eighteenth century of performance by a court of equity of a
contract in which the plaintiff held an option.
The last thought in Bell v. Howard suggests another result which we may expect to find from the idea that equity
Bill for specific performance of articles of agree23 9 Mod. 302, 1742.
ment for the sale of an advowson.
1
The case is also decided against the plaintiff because of undue influence and laches, and the fact that the plaintiff had waived the contract.
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requires a mutuality of obligation not required at law.

Where B. cannot fulfil his contract with A., and A. therefore can terminate the contract, equity at the instance of A.,
will not compel B. to carry out his contract as far as he is
able to carry it out. And this is exactly the conclusion
20
worked out by Lord Redesdale in Lawrenson v. Butler.
The defendant had agreed to give a deed of land which he
had no power to give unless the deed contained a proviso
that it should be void against male issue. The plaintiff
sought specific performance with the proviso. As in all the
modem cases where the defendant cannot give what he has
contracted to give, there was no obligation on the plaintiff's
part to do anything. There are two ways in which the law
can regard such a situation.

The law can say the parties

have made a mistake in the subject-matter of the contract.
There was an agreement, but no contract which a court can
enforce, because the subject does not exist. Or the court

can say the failure of the defendant to fulfil the representations which led to the making of the contract places the
plaintiff in a position of having given a consideration for the
option to call on the defendant f6r -the performance of as
many of his promises as he is able to perform. Lord Redesdale first takes the second possible attitude towards the relative position of the parties, btift ,denies the right of the
plaintiff to specific performance .ou the ground that he will
not put the defendant in a situation "thai if the agreement
was averse to him he would be table to the performance,
and yet if advantageous
to him he could not compel a per21
formance.1

Although in a later part of. his opinion in this case Lord
Redesdale takes the first possible attitude towards the relations of the parties by pointing out that owing to a mistake
there is no contract, he would never have written the first

paragraph if there had not been in existence the idea that
equity required a mutuality of obligation which would prevent the court dealing with a contract -which could be
regarded as existing or terminable at the pleasure of one
party.
01

Sch. & Lef., page 13,

' Page I8.

1802.
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We find in the eighteenth century one apparent exception
to the principle that a court of equity will hot place a
defendant into the position of being bound or not at
the option of the plaintiff. This apparent exception is
found in Staplton v. Staplton.22 In that case a man had
two sons. There was a doubt regarding the legitimacy of
the eldest. In order to prevent a dispute over this subject
the father and the two sons agreed to do all that was necessary to settle the family estate on the father for life and on
his death one-half to each son. The eldest son died in the
lifetime of the father, leaving a son, the plaintiff in the case;
then the father died. The plaintiff after failing to prove the
legitimacy of his father sought to force his uncle to fulfill
his covenant and do those acts necessary to give the plaintiff
one-half the estate. The court, after dealing with the questions raised, pertaining to the law of real property, addresses
itself to the question whether there was a valuable consideration for entering into the agreement, and decides that a
compromise of a doubtful right is a sufficient foundation for
an agreement. The question of consideration having been
disposed of, the court then continues as follows: "Another
objection has been made to this agreement that the benefit
on Henry and Philip's side was not mutual and equal. During both their lives the benefit and obligation was equal, and
Henry would have been equally compellable to suffer a
recovery with Philip. But it is stated that an alteration as
to their mutual benefit has happened by the death of Henry,
and it is said that if Henry had been legitimate the plaintiff
would not have been compellable to suffer a recovery because
the issue in tail is not compellable to perform the covenants
of his ancestor the tenant in tail. But here the clause was
at first equal, and it is hard to say that an act of God should
hinder the agreement from being carried into execution.
If Henry had been legitimate and Philip had died
in Henry's life leaving children, I am of the opinion Philip's
sons would have been able to come against Henry for execution of the agreement. ' 23 In short, if an agreement had
i Atk. 2, 1739.

Page

12.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS.

mutuality in obligation at its initiation, an act beyond the
control of the parties making it obligatory in a law on one
party only would not prevent the party no longer bound from
having specific performance in equity of the defendant's
promises. This case is instructive, not only as illustrating
an exception to the idea that in equity there must be mutuality of obligation, but as bringing out the thought that
"lack of mutuality" in the eighteenth century was neither
lack of mutuality in the remedy on the one hand, or, on the
other merely the defence of "no contract" expressed in a
roundabout way. In the passage just quoted it will be
observed that the court first dealt with the question of lack
of consideration, and then as a separate question with the
alleged lack of mutuality in obligation.
Another intimation in the eighteenth century of the possibility of a further exception to the idea that there must be
mutuality of obligation might be thought to be found in
Campbell v. Leach.2 4 The case decides that a tenant for life
with power to lease for years could bind the remainderman.
The question was raised in the argument whether the
remainderman could enforce the lease against the lessee.
Lord De Grey is reported to have said ".

.

.

and I do

not know that the remainderman could enforce the contract of such tenant for life." 25 But in Shannon v. Bradstreet, a case involving a point similar to that of Campbell
v. Leach., Lord Redesdale doubts the correctness of the passage above quoted. 26

Whether Lord De Grey is misquoted

or not, the passage cited is, I believe, the only evidence that
it was at one time supposed that the lessee of a tenant for
life, the lesor having power to lease beyond the duration of
his life tenancy, was not bound to the remainderman. It
would appear therefore that in equity both the lessee and the
remainderman were bound in spite of Lord De Grey's
reported dicta to the contrary, and that both could have had
specific performance in equity.
'

Arb. 740,

1774.
Page 749; 1 Sch. Lef.

52,

i8o3, page 65.

Sugden, in his work on Powers, page 365, note i, agrees with Lord

Redesdale in thinking that DeGrey is misquoted. Sugden can also be
found in Blunt's ed. of Ambler's Reports, page 749, note 17.
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In the early years of the nineteenth century the peculiar
idea of lack of mutuality of obligation as a special defence
in equity appears in two cases. The first is Howel v.
George.27 There the defendant had agreed to convey to the
plaintiff certain premises of which he was possessed under
a settlement. When the agreement was made the defendant
thought he had the power to convey a fee. Afterwards he
found that the only way he could bar the settlement under
which he held the land was to purchase other lands of equal
value and settle the lands so purchased to the same uses.
The plaintiff asked the court to require the defendant to
make such a purchase. Vice-Chancellor Plumber says, in
refusing the application, "The want of mutuality in a contract is sufficient ground for refusing specific performance.
WNas there mutuality in this contract? Could the defendant
have insisted on the plaintiff waiting until he could procure
the estate by means of his power under the proviso? Certainly not. ' 28 The case is similar to Lawrenson v. Butler.
The second case is one before Lord Eldon, Clarke v.
Price.2 9 Price had agreed with Clarke to write reports in
the exchequer. There is some doubt whether Price was
obliged to give all the reports he wrote to Clarke, but no
doubt from the wording of the agreement that Clarke had
a right to terminate the contract at any time. Lord Eldon,
after deciding the case on other grounds, in the closing sentence of his opinion adopts the argument of Price's counsel,
saying, "It is also quite clear that there is no mutuality in
this agreement." The contract was a good contract. The
only want of mutuality is in the sense in which that term was
used in Bromley v. Jefferies; the same lack of mutuality
which is in every contract containing an option to purchase
or in every contract terminable at the option of one party.
If Flight v. Bolland is the first case in which the defence of
I Maddock, 13, I8I
5.
'Page ig. The citation in support of this opinion by Plumber, used
by the reporter, is Anniger v. Clarke, Bunb. inI, supra, p. 276. The
case would probably be followed to-day, as the facts show that there
existed great uncertainty in regard to the defendant's ability to procure
other land in accordance with his power in the settlement.
"2 Wilson Ch. 157, 18ig.
t
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lack of mutuality in the remedy is used with effect, Clarke v.
Price, as far as the writer is aware, is the last mention made
in England of the idea that equity requires a mutuality of
obligation not required at law. In America the cases of
Bromley v. Jeffteries and Lawrenson v. Butler, and the conception of the defence of lack of mutuality embodied in
them, have had a much more persistent influence. The history of that influence and its present effect on our law in
this country are subjects which I hope to take up in a subsequent article.
Before leaving our present subject, however, there are a
few questions I should like to anticipate. Admitting that an
examination of the cases in England prior to Flight v. Bolland does not show any case in which lack of mutuality in the
remedy is the moving cause for the decision, and admitting
also the prevalence of the idea that there was a special
defence of lack of mutuality in the obligation applicable to
the defendant in equity which might not be applicable to the
same defendant when sued at law, why the idea of the judge
who decided Flight v. Bolland that he was applying a wellknown and universally admitted principle, and why the general acquiescence of the profession both at the time and
since? Such a qtiestion is easily answered. It is true that
the defence of lack of mutuality, meaning lack of mutuality
of obligation, is radically different from a defence which
admits the mutually binding force of the respective promises of the plaintiff and the defendant and sets up a lack of
mutuality in the remedy in equity. At the same time there
is a lack of mutuality of the remedy, in one sense, if only the
defendant is bound, and the common law lawyers, as distinguished from the equity lawyers, were not the only
persons who had a tendency to look at substantive legal
relations through the medium of procedure. While Flight
v. Bolland is the first decision founded on the idea that the
remedy must be mutual, no prior case had raised and repudiated that conception of the lack of mutuality as a defence.
And indeed it may hardly be questioned but that, if a case
involving lack of mutuality in the remedy, not due to the
effect of the Statute of Frauds, had arisen at any time
within fify years before Flight v. Bolland, the decision
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would have been the same as in that case. In other words,
there was a general notion, probably more or less vague,
just as it is vague to-day, that mutuality is an important
thing in equity, and so we have the easy and unnoticed
transition from one idea of lack of mutuality to another and
really radically different idea.
Another question which may be asked is: If there existed
in the eighteenth and early part of the nineteenth century
the idea that to specifically enforce a contract in equity there
must be mutuality in obligation in the peculiar sense which
would render a contract containing an option given on a
good consideration not enforceable in equity, how can we
explain the fact that there are large numbers of cases, some
even antedating Bromley v. Tefferies, in which the lessee is
allowed to bring a bill to force the lessor to renew his lease,
the lessee having an option to renew in the original lease?
Again, how can we explain the total disappearance in Englarnd, and not in America, of the idea that mutuality of obligation in equity is something more than the mere requirement, common to law as well as to equity, that a contract
must have two parties in order to be a contract? These two
questions I shall take up together in subsequent articles
,on the specific performance of contracts containing an option.
William DraperLewis.

